Diplo Space
Spatial governance explainer · lunar

Two rulebooks, one Moon.

Two coalitions are writing the rules for the same lunar ground — and both say they're following the same 1967 treaty. This explainer maps who has signed what, and where they actually diverge. We render both sides and both readings; we don't tell you which is right.

The contested ground

The Moon both rulebooks are written for.

The real lunar south pole — the region both coalitions are racing toward, on real public-domain NASA hardware. The arrangement is notional; the contest over who governs it is not.

the-observatory / moon / lunar-south-poleNASA HARDWARE · NOTIONAL LAYOUT

The hardware is real and public-domain — NASA 3D Resources models (Habitat Demonstration Unit, Apollo Lunar Module, Base Station) on the real lunar south pole; the surface upgrades to photoreal NASA LRO terrain (Cesium Moon Terrain) once that asset is on the ion account. The arrangement is notional, and the green outlines — school, clinic, family quarters — are deliberately empty: nobody has modeled them. That’s the point. Why a school is the hard part →

Who has signed what

Two coalitions, two counts.

U.S.-led (NASA / State Department)

The Artemis Accords

67 signatory nations

Paraguay became the 67th on May 7, 2026.

Who: From the U.S., U.K., Japan, and most of Europe to India, Brazil, Nigeria, the UAE, and dozens more.

Affirms it operates under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty; treats space-resource extraction as consistent with the Treaty's non-appropriation rule, and uses notified “safety zones” to implement the Treaty's Article IX “due regard” principle and prevent harmful interference.

Source: NASA Artemis Accords; U.S. Department of State

China–Russia-led (CNSA / Roscosmos)

The ILRS

~17 countries & organizations

Plus 50+ research institutions, per CNSA (April 2025).

Who: Including Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Pakistan, South Africa, Thailand, Venezuela, Kazakhstan, and Senegal.

An alternative framework for a lunar base — construction planned 2026–2035, operations from the 2030s. It positions itself as a coalition outside the Western-led Accords, while also grounding its cooperation in existing space law.

Source: CNSA; Secure World Foundation lunar-cooperation tracking

The shared foundation

Same treaty. Different reading.

Both blocs claim the same foundation: the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which says space is for peaceful use, belongs to no nation (Article II), and that states answer for what they launch (Article VI). The split is not about whether the Treaty applies — it's about what it permits.

Where they diverge

The disagreement, stated from both sides.

This is the part a non-specialist most needs and least often gets: not who’s right, but exactly what’s being argued.

The contested pointWhether carving out “safety zones” or otherwise demarcating parts of the lunar surface — for resource extraction, heritage protection, or de-confliction — can be done without amounting to a de-facto territorial claim that the Treaty's Article II non-appropriation rule forbids.
One readingProponents argue safety zones merely implement the Treaty's existing “due regard” duty (Article IX) and that using resources without claiming sovereignty is squarely Treaty-consistent.
The other readingCritics argue that dividing or demarcating the surface — however framed — risks the appropriation the Treaty was written to prevent, and that the question is genuinely unsettled in international law.

The two blocs aren't strictly exclusive: a few states — Thailand and Senegal among them — have signed onto both. Whether the Accords and the ILRS can ultimately be reconciled is, by most accounts, still an open question.

Sources

Built from the primary record.

Counts current as of June 2026. Spot an error or a stale figure? Email a correction.

See the incident record →Rehearse a scenario
A line we keep in writing

Diplo Space, Inc. is a neutral, public-interest research and education lab. It uses open-source and public-domain data to translate space-governance regimes into navigable scenarios and exercises for non-specialist officials. It takes no policy positions, accepts no foreign-government funding, and is not affiliated with the U.S. Department of State, the Department of War, or any government agency.