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Spatial governance explainer · lunar

Two rulebooks, one Moon.

Two coalitions are writing the rules for the same lunar ground. Both say they're following the same 1967 treaty. This explainer maps who has signed what, and where they actually diverge. We render both sides and both readings; we don't tell you which is right.

Who has signed what

Two coalitions, two counts.

U.S.-led (NASA / State Department)

The Artemis Accords

71 signatory nations

Türkiye became the 71st on August 31, 2026, six weeks after Mauritius, the 70th. Official pace check: 13 nations signed in FY 2025 alone, reaching 59 by September 30, 2025 (Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, FY 2025).

Who: From the U.S., U.K., Japan, and most of Europe to India, Brazil, Nigeria, the UAE, and dozens more.

Affirms it operates under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty; treats space-resource extraction as consistent with the Treaty's non-appropriation rule, and uses notified “safety zones” to implement the Treaty's Article IX “due regard” principle and prevent harmful interference.

Source: NASA Artemis Accords; U.S. Department of State

China–Russia-led (CNSA / Roscosmos)

The ILRS

~17 countries & organizations

Plus 50+ research institutions, per CNSA (April 2025).

Who: Including Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Pakistan, South Africa, Thailand, Venezuela, Kazakhstan, and Senegal.

An alternative framework for a lunar base: construction planned 2026–2035, operations from the 2030s. It positions itself as a coalition outside the Western-led Accords, while also grounding its cooperation in existing space law.

Source: CNSA; Secure World Foundation lunar-cooperation tracking

NASA graphic showing the flags of all 70 Artemis Accords signatory nations as of July 2026, from Angola to Uruguay, over an image of the Moon

The 70 signatories as of July 2026; Türkiye became the 71st on August 31, 2026. Image: NASA, published with the Mauritius signing announcement ↗

The shared foundation

Same treaty. Different reading.

Both blocs claim the same foundation: the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which says space is for peaceful use, belongs to no nation (Article II), and that states bear international responsibility for their own national activities in space, including those carried on by private companies (Article VI). The split is not about whether the Treaty applies: it's about what it permits.

Where they diverge

The disagreement, stated from both sides.

This is the part a non-specialist most needs: not who’s right, but exactly what’s being argued.

The contested pointWhether carving out “safety zones” or otherwise demarcating parts of the lunar surface (for resource extraction, heritage protection, or de-confliction) can be done without amounting to a de-facto territorial claim that the Treaty's Article II non-appropriation rule forbids.
One readingProponents argue safety zones merely implement the Treaty's existing “due regard” duty (Article IX) and that using resources without claiming sovereignty is squarely Treaty-consistent.
The other readingCritics argue that dividing or demarcating the surface, however framed, risks the appropriation the Treaty was written to prevent, and that the question is genuinely unsettled in international law.

The two blocs aren't strictly exclusive: three states have signed both, Thailand in December 2024, Senegal in July 2025, and Serbia, an ILRS partner, which signed the Accords on 16 July 2026 (NASA; SpaceNews). Whether the Accords and the ILRS can ultimately be reconciled is, by most accounts, still an open question.

And beneath the rulebook fight sits a longer question: both coalitions are racing toward the same ground, and someone eventually has to live on it. That is the settlement question.

Sources

Built from the primary record.

Counts current as of July 2026. Spot an error or a stale figure? Email a correction.

The settlement question →See the incident recordRehearse a scenario