Space governance you can step inside.
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The neutral scenario record
The substrate everything else is built on.
A record, not a feed. Every space-governance incident and stress point we publish is dated and tied to a primary source a human opened. We correct mistakes in the open — it's the verified ground the explainers and scenarios stand on, built to still check out when your memo is read a year from now.
The PNT & infrastructure dataset
The first and largest dataset in the record.
GPS/GNSS interference and the policy moves around it — where the record runs deepest today. Lunar-governance, spectrum, and debris datasets are filling in on the same standard.
2026-06-09Persistent GNSS interference continues around HormuzIncidentMaritime · Energy · Persian Gulf / Strait of HormuzP&I club Skuld, citing UKMTO/JMIC advisories, reported persistent GNSS interference across the Hormuz approaches, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Gulf — continuing since March at reduced intensity, with masters advised to cross-check positions by radar and visual bearings.Coordination response: Coordination ran through maritime channels — UKMTO/JMIC navigational-safety advisories and the IMO's MSC 111 receiver-standard updates (May 2026). As a maritime, not aviation, theatre it drew no ICAO-level state condemnation.Source: Skuld maritime security update, June 9, 2026, citing UKMTO/JMIC ↗
2026-06-04House subcommittee hearing on PNT capabilitiesHearingAll · United StatesThe House E&C communications subcommittee examined U.S. PNT capabilities ("Where Are We?"); testimony counted more than 55,000 commercial-aviation GPS interference events in 2025, up 24% in a year. No legislation emerged from the hearing.Source: House Energy & Commerce, Subcommittee on Communications & Technology ↗
2026-05-27House FY27 defense mark seeks single DoD PNT overseerPolicyAll · United StatesThe House Armed Services chairman's mark of the FY27 NDAA (H.R. 8800) was reported to designate a single Pentagon official to oversee the DoD PNT enterprise, including alternative-PNT programs; full-committee markup followed June 4.Source: House Armed Services Committee; Inside GNSS reporting ↗
2026-05-26Lithuania: Kaliningrad spoofing antennas grew twelvefoldIncidentAviation · Maritime · Telecom · Baltic regionLithuania's communications regulator RRT reported spoofing antennas in Kaliningrad rose from three in early 2025 to 36, with effects reaching roughly 450 km into six neighboring countries — describing the interference as systemic rather than occasional.Coordination response: Part of the Russia-attributed Baltic campaign that drove the 13-EU-member-state letter to the European Commission (June 2025), the EASA–EUROCONTROL Joint Action Plan (March 25, 2026), and ICAO's 42nd Assembly condemnation of Russia by name (Oct 3, 2025).Source: RRT (Lithuanian regulator) via Reuters interview; corroborating coverage ↗
2026-05-21RAF jet carrying UK defence secretary GPS-jammedIncidentAviation · United Kingdom / Baltic regionAn RAF flight returning Defence Secretary John Healey from Estonia reportedly lost satellite navigation for the full three-hour flight; pilots reverted to backup navigation. A UK defence source blamed Russian interference — the second UK defence secretary's flight affected since March 2024.Coordination response: Falls under the Russia-attributed interference ICAO's 42nd Assembly condemned by name (Oct 3, 2025); raised by the UK and allies through NATO channels. No standalone state response to this specific flight.Source: The Times (first report); UK defence source via Kyiv Independent ↗
2026-05-20SpaceX S-1 discloses 1,000+ daily collision-avoidance maneuversResearchCritical infrastructure · United States (SEC)SpaceX's IPO registration statement discloses that its ~9,600 Starlink satellites accounted for roughly 75% of all active maneuverable satellites in orbit and proactively performed over 1,000 automated collision-avoidance maneuvers per day in 2025 — and lays out plans for orbital AI-compute constellations "with potentially millions of satellites" beginning as early as 2028. Orbital-congestion figures, now on the record in a sworn securities filing.Source: SpaceX Form S-1, SEC EDGAR (filed May 20, 2026) ↗
2026-05Lebanon NOTAM warns of GNSS loss in Beirut FIRIncidentAviation · Lebanon / eastern MediterraneanLebanon's active NOTAM warns of possible GNSS loss in the Beirut flight information region due to increased jamming and spoofing, directing crews to conventional routes — issued mid-May amid regional escalation.Source: Beirut FIR NOTAM, via Notamify; OPSGROUP SafeAirspace ↗
2026-04Space Force terminates the $6.3B GPS OCX ground programPolicyAll · United StatesTerminated after roughly $6.3B over testing failures — weeks after industry urged completing it (see Sep 2025 letter). GPS control pivots to Lockheed Martin's legacy AEP ground system under a $105M April 2026 upgrade contract; OCX stays in limited use for GPS III checkout.Source: U.S. Space Force announcement; SpaceNews, April 2026 ↗
2026-03Gulf jamming surges to 1,650+ ships in one dayIncidentMaritime · Energy · Persian Gulf / Gulf of OmanWindward reported GPS and AIS jamming affecting more than 1,650 ships on March 7 — up 55% in a week — across at least 30 jamming clusters from Kuwait to Muscat. UKMTO logged 13 incidents in nine days.Source: Windward analysis, March 8, 2026; gCaptain citing UKMTO/JMIC ↗
2026-03IATA: jamming up 67%, spoofing up 193% in 2025ResearchAviation · GlobalIATA's 2025 Annual Safety Report counted jamming incidents up 67% and spoofing up 193% versus 2023; its director general called the interference "unacceptable and irresponsible."Source: IATA 2025 Annual Safety Report (released March 9, 2026) ↗
2026-03Brief GPS spoofing burst recorded near Dallas–Fort WorthIncidentAviation · United StatesIndependent analysts reported a short-lived spoofing event near DFW — notable because the area's larger 2022 interference mystery was never solved.Source: RNT Foundation analysis, March 2026 ↗
2026-03-07UK commits £180M to National Timing CentreFundingAll · United KingdomThe UK announced £180 million for the next phase of the NPL-led National Timing Centre — a terrestrial atomic-clock network providing sovereign backup to satellite-derived time — following the November 2025 £155M resilience package.Source: GOV.UK (DSIT press release, March 7, 2026) ↗
2026-02GPS jamming hits 1,100+ ships after strikes on IranIncidentMaritime · Energy · Middle East Gulf, incl. Strait of HormuzWithin 24 hours of the late-February strikes, Windward reported more than 1,100 vessels with GPS/AIS interference across the Gulf — spoofed positions placed ships at airports and a nuclear plant; Hormuz transits ran about a third below normal.Source: Windward analysis, March 1, 2026; corroborated by gCaptain and CNN ↗
2025-12FAA publishes GPS/GNSS Interference Resource GuidePolicyAviation · United StatesConsolidated FAA guidance for operators and pilots on recognizing, mitigating, and reporting jamming and spoofing (v1.0 dated Dec 4, 2025; updated v1.1 March 2026).Source: Federal Aviation Administration ↗
2025-11UK funds £155M PNT resilience packageFundingAll · United KingdomThe UK's science department announced £155 million for PNT resilience: £71M toward an eLoran terrestrial backup, £68M for the National Timing Centre, £13M for GNSS interference monitoring, and £3M for space-based time-transfer research.Source: UK DSIT announcement, November 19, 2025, via Inside GNSS ↗
2025-10DOT awards ~$5M for complementary PNT (Rapid Phase II)FundingTransportation · Grid · Finance · United StatesFive contracts (incl. NAB, Iridium, UrsaNav, Viavi) to deploy and test technologies that can back up GPS timing and positioning.Source: U.S. Department of Transportation ↗
2025-10-03ICAO Assembly condemns Russian and North Korean interferencePolicyAviation · International (ICAO)ICAO's 42nd Assembly endorsed the Council's determination that recurring GNSS interference originating from Russia — and, in a companion resolution, North Korea — constitutes an infraction of the Chicago Convention, and urgently called on both states to cease.Source: ICAO 42nd Assembly resolutions, October 3, 2025 ↗
2025-09Industry coalition presses DoD and DOT on GPS modernizationPolicyAviation · United StatesA 14-organization coalition spanning aviation, maritime, automotive, and satellite sectors wrote to the Secretaries of Defense and Transportation urging GPS modernization — aging-satellite replacement, the OCX ground segment, and counter-spoofing signal authentication.Source: GPSIA-led coalition letter, September 5, 2025 ↗
2025-07-24EU declares Galileo anti-spoofing authentication operationalPolicyAll · European UnionThe EU declared Galileo's Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) operational — per EUSPA the first GNSS offering open-signal data authentication, letting receivers verify that navigation messages are genuine and detect spoofing.Source: EUSPA, July 24, 2025 ↗
2025-06EASA–IATA plan cites 220% rise in GPS signal lossResearchAviation · GlobalA joint EASA–IATA mitigation plan cited IATA flight-data showing GPS signal-loss events rose 220% between 2021 and 2024 as interference spread beyond conflict zones.Source: EASA–IATA joint press release, June 18, 2025 ↗
2025-06-13Six European states bring Baltic jamming case to ICAOPolicyAviation · Estonia · Finland · Latvia · Lithuania · Poland · SwedenThe ICAO Council took up evidence from six states attributing Baltic-region GNSS interference to Russian territory, after the ITU's Radio Regulations Board geolocated sources to Russia in March 2025. A Council letter to Russia that July went unanswered.Source: ICAO Assembly Working Paper A42-WP/553 ↗
2025-06Jamming averages ~970 ships a day near HormuzIncidentMaritime · Energy · Strait of Hormuz / Arabian GulfDuring the June 2025 Israel–Iran conflict, Windward measured an average of 972 vessels a day with GPS jamming (peak 1,155); UKMTO and the CMF information center traced interference to the vicinity of Bandar Abbas, and some ships shifted to daylight transits.Source: Windward analysis, June 19, 2025; UKMTO/JMIC advisories via gCaptain ↗
2025-03FCC opens inquiry on PNT (WT Docket 25-110)PolicyAll · United StatesStill the live U.S. proceeding — a Notice of Inquiry (FCC 25-20) on promoting PNT technologies, not yet a proposed rule; no NPRM had been adopted as of mid-June 2026. (NextNav's 902–928 MHz petition for rulemaking is the separate WT Docket 24-240.) An earlier note here claimed a draft rule had reached White House OIRA review; that could not be confirmed against a primary source and has been corrected.Source: FCC, WT Docket No. 25-110 (Notice of Inquiry, FCC 25-20) ↗
2025-02DHS releases resilient-PNT best practicesPolicyCritical infrastructure · United StatesDHS Science & Technology released best practices for critical-infrastructure owners using GPS timing (document dated September 2024).Source: DHS Science & Technology Directorate ↗
2024-10China reports completed nationwide eLoran timing backupPolicyFinance · Telecom · ChinaChinese media reported completion of three new long-wave timing stations extending nationwide eLoran-class coverage; National Time Service Center researchers describe the ground network as a backup to BeiDou timing for finance and communications — the capability the U.S. retired in 2010.Source: The Paper, via Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation ↗
2024-09OPSGROUP: spoofed flights grew ~300 to ~1,500/dayResearchAviation · GlobalThe GPS Spoofing WorkGroup's final report estimated, from ADS-B data, that civil flights affected by spoofing grew five-fold between January and August 2024 — and called the figures likely undercounts.Source: OPSGROUP, Report of the 2024 GPS Spoofing Workgroup ↗
2024-07DOT awards $7.2M for complementary PNTFundingTransportation · Grid · Finance · United StatesContracts to nine vendors under the Complementary PNT Action Plan's rapid phase — the first major U.S. procurement step toward GPS backup since the Volpe demonstrations.Source: U.S. Department of Transportation ↗
2024-05North Korean jamming waves hit South Korean aviation and shippingIncidentAviation · Maritime · Korean PeninsulaSeoul reported multi-day GPS jamming attributed to North Korea affecting hundreds of aircraft and vessels — a pattern recurring since the 2010s.Source: South Korean government statements; international press ↗
2024-04Finnair suspends Tartu flights after GPS interferenceIncidentAviation · EstoniaA month-long suspension (Apr 29–May 31) after interference forced two flights to abandon approaches — Tartu's only instrument approach then required GPS. Estonian officials attributed the interference to Russian jamming.Source: Finnair; Estonian authorities; international press ↗
2024-03RAF aircraft carrying UK defence secretary jammed near KaliningradIncidentAviation · Baltic regionA UK government flight experienced GPS jamming over the Baltic, widely attributed to Russian electronic warfare — interference reaching official state aviation.Source: UK Ministry of Defence statements; international press ↗
2024GPS interference spreads across Red Sea shipping lanesIncidentMaritime · Red Sea / Eastern MediterraneanCommercial shipping reported widespread GPS disruption amid regional conflict, complicating navigation and AIS position reporting in one of the world's busiest corridors.Source: Maritime industry advisories; tracking analyses ↗
2024-01EASA and IATA convene GNSS-interference workshopPolicyAviation · Europe / GlobalAfter a jointly hosted workshop in Cologne, regulator and industry called rising jamming and spoofing a safety risk and agreed measures on incident reporting, manufacturer guidance, alerting, and keeping conventional navaids as backup.Source: EASA / IATA joint press release, January 26, 2024 ↗
2024-02CISA issues federal PNT acquisition guidancePolicyCritical infrastructure · United StatesVoluntary guidance from CISA and an interagency working group walking federal buyers through PNT dependencies, resilience levels, and contract language — supporting EO 13905's procurement direction.Source: CISA, Federal PNT Services Acquisitions Guidance v1.0 (Feb 2024) ↗
2023-09Mass spoofing of civil aviation begins in Middle East corridorsIncidentAviation · Middle EastFirst wide reporting of spoofed positions corrupting aircraft navigation systems near conflict zones — the onset of the phenomenon OPSGROUP later quantified.Source: OPSGROUP; subsequent industry advisories
2022-10GPS interference disrupts Dallas–Fort Worth airspaceIncidentAviation · United StatesThe FAA reported roughly 44 hours of disruption; runway 35R was declared unusable and temporarily closed. The source was never publicly identified.Source: FAA advisories; contemporaneous reporting ↗
2022-03EASA bulletin warns of conflict-zone GNSS jamming and spoofingPolicyAviation · EuropeSafety Information Bulletin 2022-02 alerted operators to intensifying interference in regions around Ukraine, the Baltic, and the eastern Mediterranean after Russia's invasion.Source: EASA SIB 2022-02
2022-01Denver-area GPS interference eventIncidentAviation · United StatesA transmitter inadvertently broadcasting in the GPS band disrupted the Denver area for roughly 33 hours; federal officials shut it down but never publicly identified the device.Source: CISA Insights; FAA; contemporaneous reporting ↗
2021-11-15Russian ASAT test destroys Cosmos 1408; ISS crew sheltersIncidentHuman spaceflight · orbital debris · RussiaRussia tested a direct-ascent anti-satellite missile against its own defunct Cosmos 1408 at roughly 465–490 km. U.S. Space Command reported more than 1,500 trackable debris pieces the same day; NASA catalogued 1,604 by March 2022, modeling that over 90% would reenter within five years. The ISS crew — astronauts and cosmonauts alike — sheltered in their docked spacecraft for two passes of the cloud.Coordination response: Condemned the same day by the U.S. secretary of state; U.S. Space Command committed to sharing debris-tracking data with all spacefaring nations. In April 2022 the U.S. announced it would not conduct destructive direct-ascent ASAT tests — per the White House, the first country to commit. In December 2022 the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 77/41 on such testing, 155–9 with 9 abstentions.Source: U.S. Space Command / NASA Orbital Debris Quarterly News (March 2022) / NASA release 21-156 ↗
2021-10IMO circular urges states to curb GNSS interferencePolicyMaritime · International (IMO)IMO's Maritime Safety Committee issued circular MSC.1/Circ.1644 urging member states to minimize deliberate GNSS interference from their territory, warn mariners about affected areas, and prevent unauthorized transmissions on satellite-navigation frequencies.Source: IMO MSC.1/Circ.1644 (October 2021) ↗
2021-06South Korea brings eLoran testbed into servicePolicyMaritime · South KoreaAfter repeated North Korean jamming since 2010, South Korea's ministry-funded eLoran testbed began service June 1, 2021, giving ships terrestrial backup positioning around Incheon and Pyeongtaek — the capability the U.S. legislated but never funded.Source: MOF-funded KRISO program (peer-reviewed papers); trade press ↗
2021-01Space Policy Directive 7 sets U.S. PNT policyPolicyAll · United StatesUpdated the national policy for space-based PNT, including resilience expectations for users and the GPS enterprise.Source: Space Policy Directive 7 (Jan 2021) ↗
2021-01DOT reports to Congress on GPS backup technologiesResearchAll · United StatesThe Volpe Center's demonstration report evaluated 11 candidate complementary-PNT technologies — still the reference evaluation; no single system backs up everything.Source: U.S. DOT / Volpe Center ↗
2020-06China completes the BeiDou-3 constellationPolicyAll · ChinaThe final BeiDou-3 satellite completed China's independent global GNSS — paired, by public accounts, with continued investment in terrestrial timing backup the U.S. lacks.Source: Chinese government announcements; international coverage ↗
2020-02Executive Order 13905 on responsible use of PNTPolicyAll · United StatesDirected federal agencies to identify PNT dependencies and develop resilience profiles — the cornerstone U.S. policy on the issue.Source: Federal Register, EO 13905 (Feb 12, 2020) ↗
2019-11"Crop-circle" spoofing rings detected at Shanghai portIncidentMaritime · ChinaAIS data analyzed by C4ADS showed thousands of ships' positions over a year jumping to rings on the Huangpu's eastern bank — nearly 300 vessels spoofed in a single day. Origin unknown.Source: C4ADS analysis, reported by MIT Technology Review (Nov 2019) ↗
2019-06Pilots report persistent GPS disruption in Israeli airspaceIncidentAviation · Israel / Eastern MediterraneanCrews around Ben Gurion reported weeks of GPS disruption from June 2019; IFALPA documented signal loss while Israel's airline pilots association attributed false-position readings to suspected spoofing. Landings shifted to ILS.Source: IFALPA safety bulletin 19SAB05; Israel Airline Pilots Association ↗
2019NIST-sponsored study models GPS outage at ~$1B/dayResearchAll · United StatesRTI International modeled a hypothetical 30-day nationwide outage at roughly $1B per day on average ($16–35B total) — likely an underestimate, the authors note, and impacts grow as backup clocks drift.Source: RTI International for NIST, 2019 ↗
2019-04GPS week-number rollover trips legacy equipmentIncidentTelecom · Aviation · GlobalA long-scheduled counter rollover still caused scattered faults in older receivers — a reminder that timing dependencies hide in unmaintained corners.Source: Vendor advisories; contemporaneous reporting ↗
2019-03C4ADS identifies 9,883 suspected spoofing instancesResearchMaritime · Aviation · Russia / Black Sea / Syria"Above Us Only Stars" used publicly available data to identify 9,883 suspected spoofing instances since 2016, correlated with Russian head-of-state movements and protected facilities — the first large public evidence base.Source: C4ADS, "Above Us Only Stars" (March 26, 2019) ↗
2018-12National Timing Resilience and Security ActPolicyGrid · Finance · Telecom · United StatesRequired DOT — subject to appropriations that never came — to establish a land-based backup timing system. It remains unbuilt, which is the open question behind most rows above.Source: Public Law 115-282, §514 (49 U.S.C. §312) ↗
2018-11GPS jamming during NATO's Trident Juncture exerciseIncidentAviation · Norway / FinlandNorway's defense ministry said jamming recorded Oct 16–Nov 7 came from Russian forces on the Kola Peninsula; Finland said Russia possibly caused disruptions that prompted GPS warnings to civil aviation in Lapland.Source: Norwegian MoD statement; Finnish PM (Yle), November 2018 ↗
2018-01EU clock-synchronization rules take effect (MiFID II)PolicyFinance · European UnionRTS 25 required trading systems to keep UTC-traceable, auditable timestamps — as tight as 100 microseconds — making precise time a regulatory obligation for finance.Source: Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/574 ↗
2018Grid synchrophasor standard fixes the 1-microsecond barResearchGrid · InternationalIEEE/IEC 60255-118-1 carried forward the synchrophasor measurement requirements that, in practice, make grid wide-area monitoring a GPS-timing dependency.Source: IEEE/IEC 60255-118-1-2018
2017-06Ships report mass GPS spoofing in the Black SeaIncidentMaritime · Black SeaRoughly twenty vessels near Novorossiysk reported positions placing them inland at an airport — the incident that brought maritime spoofing into public view.Source: U.S. Maritime Administration alert; contemporaneous reporting ↗
2017-06UK study models GNSS outage at ~£1B/dayResearchAll · United KingdomLondon Economics estimated a five-day GNSS outage would cost the UK roughly £5.2 billion (£1.7B lost GVA plus £3.5B lost utility benefits) — the European counterpart to the later U.S. NIST figure.Source: London Economics for Innovate UK, UKSA & RIN, June 2017 ↗
2016-04North Korean jamming disrupts South Korean fishing fleetIncidentMaritime · Aviation · Korean PeninsulaRoughly six days of jamming from five sites (Mar 31–Apr 5); the coastguard said about 70 fishing vessels turned back, and defense officials reported some 280 vessels with GPS problems — part of a pattern dating to 2010.Source: South Korean coastguard and defense ministry; international press ↗
2016U.S. finance tightens clock-sync rules (FINRA 4590)PolicyFinance · United StatesFINRA required member firms' business clocks to synchronize within 50 milliseconds of NIST time, with documented procedures — GPS being the common delivery path.Source: FINRA Rule 4590; Regulatory Notice 16-23 ↗
2015-12Most European Loran stations cease transmissionPolicyAll · EuropeFrance, Norway, Denmark, and Germany ended Loran-C/eLoran broadcasts, closing Europe's terrestrial fallback five years after the U.S. shut LORAN-C.Source: National administrations; trade press ↗
2013-08FCC moves against driver whose jammer hit Newark airportIncidentAviation · United StatesA jammer used to defeat employer vehicle tracking repeatedly disrupted Newark's precision-approach testing. The FCC proposed a $31,875 forfeiture (settled in 2016 for far less) — the canonical example of cheap collateral interference.Source: FCC Notice of Apparent Liability, FCC 13-106 (Aug 2013) ↗
2010-02United States shuts down LORAN-CPolicyAll · United StatesThe Coast Guard terminated the terrestrial navigation and timing backbone as redundant to GPS — the decision that created the backup gap every later row tries to close.Source: U.S. Coast Guard / Federal Register, 2010 ↗
2009-02-10Iridium 33 strikes defunct Cosmos 2251IncidentComms · orbital debris · United States / RussiaThe first accidental hypervelocity collision of two intact satellites: the operational Iridium 33 and the long-defunct Russian Cosmos 2251 struck at ~789 km over the Taymyr Peninsula, ~16:56 UTC, closing at roughly 11.7 km/s. NASA catalogued well over 2,000 trackable fragments; several hundred are still tracked on orbit today. The event that turned conjunction screening from a courtesy into a standing duty.Coordination response: Catalysed broad U.S. conjunction screening for all operators (18th Space Control Squadron, later the civil TraCSS at the Office of Space Commerce); no binding international debris-liability finding followed.Source: NASA Orbital Debris Program Office / CelesTrak ↗
2007-01-11Chinese ASAT test destroys Fengyun-1CIncidentSpace operations · orbital debris · ChinaChina destroyed its own retired Fengyun-1C weather satellite with a ballistic interceptor at roughly 865 km. NASA's debris office called the cloud the single worst contamination of low Earth orbit in 50 years; the public catalog lists 3,531 tracked fragments, roughly 2,320 of them still on orbit as of July 2026 — the largest catalogued debris-generating event on record, and one still forcing ISS avoidance maneuvers.Coordination response: A formal U.S. protest — the White House called the test 'inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation' in civil space — and, per the Congressional Research Service, Australia, Canada, the U.K., South Korea, Japan, and the EU reportedly also raised concerns. China confirmed the test twelve days later, saying it 'did not target or threaten any country.' NASA noted it conflicted with debris-mitigation guidelines China's space agency had accepted in 2002.Source: NASA Orbital Debris Quarterly News (April 2007) / CelesTrak SATCAT (July 2026) / CRS RS22652 ↗
2004-12NSPD-39 establishes U.S. space-based PNT policyPolicyAll · United StatesCreated the permanent National Space-Based PNT Executive Committee, co-chaired by the Deputy Secretaries of Defense and Transportation. Superseded by SPD-7 (2021), which kept the committee — written when interference was a contingency, not a Tuesday.Source: National Security Presidential Directive 39 (2004) ↗
License: free to use, chart, brief from, or feed to your model — with attribution. Suggested citation: Diplo Space, the neutral scenario record (PNT & infrastructure dataset) (updated July 17, 2026), diplospace.org/record, row ID. Cite the update date and the row ID — both still resolve after we’ve corrected everything around them.
The verification standard
Why you can put this in a memo.
Every entry carries a named primary source a person actually opened — treaty text, a UN or agency document, a named dataset, or reputable reporting — plus the date it was last reviewed. Where sources disagree, we flag the disagreement rather than hide it. AI helps surface candidates; it never publishes. No entry reaches this page that a human hasn’t cleared against the source.
Primary source per entryDate last reviewedDisagreements flagged, not hiddenCorrections in the open
Methodology
How entries get in — and how they get fixed.
What we include
We log publicly documented incidents, policy actions, funding decisions, hearings, and research milestones that bear on space governance — the contested rules of orbit, spectrum, and the lunar surface — and on the positioning, navigation, and timing the world quietly runs on. The record runs deepest on GPS/GNSS interference today and is filling out across lunar, spectrum, and debris governance on the same standard. Each row carries a date, a jurisdiction, the sectors affected, and a named public source — with only the precision the source supports. This makes the record a floor, not a census: the true count of interference events is almost certainly higher, but every row that is here, you can check yourself. An undercount you can verify beats an estimate you have to take on faith. Where the public record allows, we also code how far an incident travelled toward a coordinated answer — from first public report through detection, geolocation, attribution, and escalation to the diplomatic response it finally drew. That chain is the read this record exists for.
Cadence & corrections
Updated as events warrant, reviewed monthly. Rows are corrected in place — upward, downward, or out — each change dated where it sits. Row anchors are permanent: a link to a row keeps resolving through corrections, which is the point — a reconstruction on a 3D globe ages out with the news cycle; a record is built to still check out on Tuesday. Source links are load-verified when a row ships, and ephemeral sources are being archived at verification time going forward. Cite the update date and the row, and a later correction becomes your paper trail instead of your problem.
Corrections
Spotted an error or a missing event? Email us with a public source and we'll review it — usually within the week.
Email a correction →How it’s tagged
Regime / domainorbital · lunar & cislunar · spectrum · PNT · debris · launch · cross-domain
Effectavailability loss · integrity compromise · degraded confidence · escalation / geopolitical response · economic disruption · safety impact
A deliberately small vocabulary, sized for the mission — not an ontology zoo.
A second dataset — country-by-country space-governance status (treaties, accords, agencies, launch capability) — is in assembly. It publishes when the first twenty-five countries are fully sourced, not before. We don’t ship empty tables.
A line we keep in writing
Diplo Space, Inc. is a neutral, public-interest research and education lab. It uses open-source and public-domain data to translate space-governance regimes into navigable scenarios and exercises for non-specialist officials. It takes no policy positions, accepts no foreign-government funding, and is not affiliated with the U.S. Department of State, the Department of War, or any government agency.